A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm's objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself.
Introduction
Free access to the commons is the driver of the original formulation of the tragedy in Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) . This, in terms of oligopoly games, directly translates into the question as to whether there might exist an optimal industry structure, or, an optimal number of firms in the commons.
The analysis of this problem can be traced back to Cornes et al. (1986) , Mason et al. (1988) and Polasky (1997, 2002) .
What follows presents in a single model the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource and a waste stock via a differential game approach. The idea that originated this paper stems from an elementary analogy between the exploitation of a renewable natural resource and waste removal, provided the dynamics according to which these two magnitudes grow over time can be assumed to be exogenously given and identical. The issue at stake, then, boils down to the following: if the state is a natural resource or species, in line of principle it would be desirable to have the largest possible stock of it left at the steady state, while the opposite holds if the state variable consists of waste. Hence, the policy implications of the ensuing analysis will be opposite in the two cases.
In building up the model, I will pose that firms define their individual objective functions attaching a positive weight to their output levels or harvest rates or, alternatively, to the individual symmetric share of the stock.
That is, a firm's objective function is defined as a combination of profits and either the control or the state variable. One way or the other, this approach, in the light of the typical interpretation deriving from an established view in the theory of industrial organization, amounts to saying that firms have separated ownership from control via delegation contracts to managers à la Vickers (1985) . However, also in this respect one can spot a dual nature of this additional feature, whereby if the common pool is a stock of waste then maximising a combination of profits and output reveals the adoption of a CSR stance by the same firms. 1 For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder I will quite freely refer to the state variable as a renewable resource or a waste stock, and specify the relevant interpretation of the state when it comes to evaluating the consequences of firms' behaviour, and therefore also the design of an appropriate regulation.
In particular, if the state measures a stock of waste, the ensuing analysis shows that including the state in the maximand is definitely preferable to the alternative based on a combination of profits and individual output (or waste removal). This is because under this specification of the model the regulator avails of a unique regulated price which drives to zero the residual stock associated to any stable equilibria arising under feedback information.
The structure of the paper is the following. The basic setup is laid out in 
The setup
The setup is an extension of Lambertini and Mantovani (2014) and Benchekroun (2008) , where a common property productive asset oligopoly is considered, and encompasses the duopoly model used in Benchekroun (2003) and Fuji-wara (2008) . The model illustrates a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction unravelling over continuous time t ∈ [0, ∞) . The market is supplied by n ≥ 1 firms 2 producing a homogeneous good, whose inverse demand function is p = a − Q at any time t, with Q = n i=1 q i . Firms share the same technology, characterised by the cost function C i = cq 2 i in which parameter c ∈ (0, a) is constant over time. Firms operate without any fixed costs. During production, each firm exploits a renewable natural resource, whose accumulation is governed by the following dynamics:
with
where S is the resource stock, δ > 0 is its implicit growth rate when the stock is at most equal to S y and δS y is the maximum sustainable yield. Taken together, (1-2) imply that (i) if the resource stock is sufficiently small the population grows at an exponential rate; and (ii) beyond S y , the asset grows at a decreasing rate. Moreover, S max is the carrying capacity of the habitat, beyond which the growth rate of the resource is negative, being limited by available amounts of food and space. In the remainder, we will confine our attention to the case in which F (S) = δS.
3
Firms play noncooperatively and choose their respective outputs simultaneously at every instant. At t = 0, each firm hires a manager whose contract 2 Under monopoly the delegation to managers would not be operated by stockholders, but CSR could be adopted, so I'm intentionally not ruling out the monopoly case. Another good reason not to do so pops up in section 4. specifies the instantaneous objective which the manager has to maximise.
Delegation contracts are observable. As in Vickers (1985) , the delegation contract establishes that the instantaneous objective function of manager i is a linear combination of profits and output:
in which θ determines the relevance of output in the firm's objective.
An alternative approach consists in supposing that the CSR managerial incentive is
where θ is a weight attached to the individual symmetric share of the stock.
Intuitively, θ > 0 seems appropriate if the state is a stock of waste. In both cases, θ is treated as a constant and is symmetric across the population of firms.
The i-th manager maximises the following discounted payoff flow
under the constraint posed by the state equation
Parameter ρ > 0 is the discount rate, common to all managers and constant over time. Obviously, if θ = 0, firms behave as pure profit-seeking entrepreneurial units.
The analysis will be carried out under the following assumption: 4 This contract is equivalent to that considered in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) , where the maximand is a weighted average of profits and revenues, M i =
A proof of the equivalence is in Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) .
This guarantees the positivity of the residual resource stock at the steady state under any feedback rules. That is, in the remainder I will leave the possibility of resource exhaustion due to an excessively large number of firms out of the picture, in order to focus solely on the effects of delegation.
In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to the game relying on (3) as model I, while that using (4) will be model II.
Model I
Here, delegation (or the adoption of a CSR stance) has the same structure as in Vickers (1985) , the instantaneous managerial objective being (3). A few words will suffice to capture the essence of the open-loop solution, which, for several reasons, is of limited interest. In the remainder of this section, I
will pose σ ≡ a + θ for the sake of simplicity. If firms don't internalise the consequences of their behaviour at any time and play the individual (static)
Cournot-Nash output
at all times, then the residual amount of the natural resource in steady state
As the remainder of the analysis is about to show, it is worth noting that the static solution corresponds to the open-loop steady state one, which in this game is unstable (see below). Let the initial condition be S (0) = S 0 > 0. The relevance of the size of S 0 on the final resource stock as well as on the stability of solutions will be discussed in the ensuing analysis.
The linear feedback solution
The game can be solved under feedback rules conjecturing a linear-quadratic value function with unknown coefficients to be determined solving the resulting system of equations to determine coefficients, or following an alternative but equivalent procedure consisting in solving the relevant first order condition w.r.t. the partial derivative of the value function. For reasons which will become evident below, here I take the latter route. The Hamilton-JacobiBellman (HJB) equation writes as:
where
In view of the ex ante symmetry across firms, one can impose the symmetry conditions q i = q (S) and V i (S) = V (S) for all i and solve FOC (9) to obtain
Substituting this into (8) yields an identity in S. Differentiating both sides with respect to S and rearranging terms, any feedback strategy is implicitly given by the following differential equation:
which must hold together with terminal condition lim t→∞ e −ρt V (s) = 0. Examining expression (11) reveals that
Then, assuming that the extraction strategy is a linear function of the stock at any time, I assume q (S) = α + βS, whereby (11) is satisfied by any pair (α, β) solving the following system:
System (14) is solved by the pairs
so that the individual equilibrium output is
where superscripts LF and OL stand for linear feedback and open-loop, respectively. That is, since the game is a linear state one by construction, one of the linear feedback strategies generated by the HJB equation degenerate in the open-loop one, coinciding with the static Cournot-Nash solution. 5 The expression on the r.h.s. of (17) 
If q = q LF (S) , the steady state level of the natural resource stock is
for all values of δ satisfying Assumption 1. It is evident that ∂S LF /∂θ > 0 since ∂S LF /∂σ > 0. That is, Lemma 1 At the linear feedback equilibrium, any increase in the extent of delegation increases the residual stock of resources in steady state.
If instead q = q OL , the steady state level of the natural resource stock associated with open-loop strategies is
everywhere.
Solutions q OL and q LF (S) , together with the locus 
Nonlinear feedback equilibria
The present game produces infinitely many nonlinear feedback solutions whose continuum can be fully characterised using the same procedure as in Lambertini (2016a) To do so, one has to go back to (11) and note that the slope of the steady state locus
which must coincide with q ′ (S) when q (S) = δS/n, in such a way that (11) becomes:
whose unique solution w.r.t. the state variable is
which is positive in the parameter range wherein S LF > 0. The associated individual output is q NLT = δS NLT /n. Superscript N LT mnemonics for nonlinear tangency solution. 
Using the corresponding expressions for the steady state values of state and control, one obtains SN LS = σ Φ (n, δ, ρ), with Φ (·) > 0. Consequently,
by the definition of σ. This boils down to the following:
The separation between ownership and control via delegation contracts based on output expansion enlarges the set of stable nonlinear feedback solutions.
In particular, since ∂S N LT /∂θ > 0, the above proposition is accompanied by a relevant corollary:
Corollary 3 The adoption of managerial incentives based on output expansion increases the upper bound of the SNLS set.
This result can be rephrased to say that these particular type of man- Take the weighted average of S LF and S NLT : A plausible solution is proposed in the next section.
The regulated case
The model remains the same as for the resource dynamics (6) and firms'
technology. Instead, here the price p is exogenously given, being a policy instrument in the hands of a public authority in charge of regulating access to the common resource pool.
Accordingly, firm i's instantaneous maximand writes
The problem is formally defined as above, as firm i's HJB equation is
Solving the game on the basis of the same procedure (or equivalently using the method of the undetermined parameters), one obtains the following pair of strategies:
where (i) σ p ≡ p + θ; (ii) superscripts have the same meaning as above; and (iii) subscript p indicates that the price of the final good is being regulated.
While q OL p > 0 over the entire parameter space, q
7 La demonstration that indeed
The interesting implication of the price regulation is that, irrespective of the information structure underpinning firms' strategies, the residual steady state resource stock is exactly the same:
which amounts to saying the following:
Proposition 5 Regulating price eliminates the multiplicity of stable feedback equilibria, with the single linear feedback one surviving.
Moreover, (32) has two relevant implications that should equally attract the attention of the authority:
• S p monotonically increases in n: hence, the minimum residual stock obtains in correspondence of n = 1. Recalling the dual interpretation of the nature of S, this fact has completely opposite implications concerning the socially efficient access to the commons.
• S p monotonically increases in σ and therefore also in the extent of delegation, θ: this reveals that including the individual instantaneous harvest rates in the delegation contracts (or, adopting a CSR stance) might or mighty not mean good news from the regulator's standpoint, again in view of the dual interpretation of the model as for the nature of the state variable.
Be that as it may, the picture looks as in Figure 3 , where again the arrows indicate the dynamics of the state S and illustrate that q open-loop and feedback information structures are not equivalent at all. In particular, the outcome engendered by q OL p can either drop to S = 0 or exceed S y , depending on the initial stock, 8 while the volume of the long-run equilibrium state variable generated by q LF p is surely S p = nσ p / (2cδ).
Figura 3
The regulated case
To close the discussion carried out in this section, let's focus our attention onto the case in which S is a stock of waste. If so, then monopoly is the 8 A peculiar and somewhat paradoxical feature of the case of waste removal is that if the initial stock is sufficiently low, firms might involuntarily drive to zero the residual stock under myopic open-loop rules. Of course it is also true that if the inital stock is large then the adoption of open-loop strategies might cause the waste stock to shoot up to plus infinity.
socially efficient structure, with
for obvious reasons, and
for all
which entails that waste removal in monopoly should be subsidised if θ > ac.
Model II
Here, the contract based on (4) p is an instrument in the regulator's hands. Additionally, for reasons which will become apparent below, I will confine myself to the case in which the state variable is a stock of waste (or, equivalently, the control of all firms has been delegated to CSR managers).
Solving this game under feedback information yields infinitely many subgame perfect strategies. This seemingly undesirable feature is driven by the fact that the HJB equation is solved by the following two linear feedback strategies:
which produce two different values of the residual waste stock in steady state:
The resulting graph replicates the picture appearing in Figure 1 , with analogous properties. In particular, also here the first (open-loop) solution is unstable, while the second is stable. Of course, there are infinitely many nonlinear solutions, a subset of which is stable. This is portrayed in Figure   4 , which, except for labels, is the same as in Figure 2 . 
for all θ > 0. This simple result can be formulated as follows: 
The same applies for any equilibrium generated by nonlinear feedback strategies, whose residual stock is S = αS 
Concluding remarks
In a nutshell, the foregoing analysis has shown that the acquired model describing the dynamic exploitation of a common pool renewable resource could be reinterpreted as a game of waste removal, changing a few labels. Of course, this involves a non trivial change of perspective, in particular when it comes to the need of regulating an oligopoly game generating a continuum of feedback equilibria. Firms are either managerial or CSR entities -depending on the interpretation being chosen -and their objective been defined in two different ways. The first formulation stipulates that the relevant objective contains profits and output (or, the instantaneous individual volume of waste removal). In this case, the adoption of feedback information generates a continuum of stable subgame perfect equilibria. The choice of regulating price sweeps away the continuum of equilibria engendered by nonlinear strategies, leaving the regulator with a single stable linear feedback equilibrium whose performance depends on the price level and the number of firms being granted access to the commons. Hence, there appears that, combining appropriately price and entry regulation, the public authority can indeed outperform the most favourable unregulated feedback equilibrium in terms of the residual resource stock at the steady state. 
